In Michaelmas 2024, I will be convening a seminar for the BPhil's in Philosophy at the University of Oxford on "Risky Ethics". A PDF of the syllabus can be found here, and details will be updated below. 

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Time and Location: 9-11am, Fridays, Ryle Room, Radcliffe Humanities Building

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Optional Pre-Reading:

• McCarthy, David. (2016). "Probability in Ethics" in Alan Hájek and Christopher Hitchcock (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of Probability and Philosophy, New York: Oxford University Press: ch.33

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Week 1. Ex ante Pareto (handout: doc/pdf)

Core readings:

• Mahtani, Anna. (2017). The Ex Ante Pareto Principle, Journal of Philosophy, 11(6): 303-323

• Gustafsson, Johan E and Kacper Kowalczyk. (forthcoming). Ex Ante Pareto Principle and Opaque Identity, Journal of Philosophy 

Additional readings:

• Mahtani, Anna. (2020). Frege’s puzzle and the ex ante Pareto principle, Philosophical Studies, 178(6): 2077-2100

 

Week 2. Egalitarianism (handout: doc/pdf)

Core readings:

• Fleurbaey, Marc and Alex Voorhoeve. (2013). “Decide As You Would With Full Information: An Argument Against Ex Ante Pareto” in Nir Eyal, Samia A. Hurst, Ole F. Norheim, Dan Wikler (eds.) Inequalities in Health, New York: Oxford University Press: ch.8

• Frick, Johann. (2013). “Uncertainty and Justifiability to Each Person: Response to Fleurbaey and Voorhoeve” in Nir Eyal, Samia A. Hurst, Ole F. Norheim, Dan Wikler (eds.) Inequalities in Health, New York: Oxford University Press: ch.9

Additional readings:

• Broome, John. (1991). Fairness, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,  91(1): 87-102

• Wasserman, David. (1996). Let them Eat Chances, Economics & Philosophy, 12(1): 29-49

• Stefánsson, Orri H. (2023). In Defence of Pigou Dalton for Prospects, Utilitas, 35: 292-311

 

Week 3. Prioritarianism (handout: doc/pdf)

Core readings:

• Otsuka, Mike and Alex Voorhoeve. (2009). Why It Matters That Some People Are Worse Off Than Others: An Argument Against the Priority View, Philosophy & Public Affairs, 37(2): 171-199

• Buchak, Lara. (2017). Taking Risks Behind the Veil of Ignorance, Ethics, 127(3): 610-644

• Van Fossen, Stephanie. (2024). Can Relative Prioritarianism Accommodate the Shift?, Ethics,  134(4): 525-537

Additional readings:

• Buchak, Lara. (2013). Risk and Rationality, New York: Oxford University Press, chs. 1-3.

• Thoma, Johana. (2023). Taking Risk on Behalf of Another,  Philosophy Compass, 18(3): 1-13

 

Week 4. Contractualism (handout: doc/pdf)

Core readings:

• Frick, Johann. (2015). Contractualism and Social Risk, Philosophy & Public Affairs, 43(3): 175-223

• Otsuka, Mike. (2015). “Risking Life and Limb: How to Discount Harms by Their Improbability” in I. Glenn Cohen, Norman Daniels, and Nir Eyal (eds.) Statistical versus Identified Victims: An Interdisciplinary Perspective, New York: Oxford University Press: ch.5

Additional readings:

• Curran, Emma. (forthcoming). "Contractualism and the Complaints of Future People", in Jacob Barrett, Hilary Greaves, and David Thorstad (eds). Essays on Longtermism, Oxford: Oxford University Press

• John, Stephen. (2014). Risk, Contractualism, and Rose’s “Prevention Paradox", Social Theory and Practice, 40(1): 28-50

• Hare, Caspar. (2012). Obligations to Merely Statistical People, Journal of Philosophy, 109(5/6): 378-390

• Steuwer, Bastian. (2021). Contractualism, Complaints, and Risk, Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, 19(2): 111-147 

 

Week 5. Partial Aggregation (handout: doc/pdf)

Core readings:

• Horton, Joe. (2020). Aggregation, Risk, and Reductio, Ethics, 130(4): 514-529

• Wu, Patrick. (2021). Aggregation and Reductio, Ethics, 132(2): 508-525

Additional readings:

• Curran, Emma. (2023). “Aggregation and Risk” in Doing Less Than Best, thesis submitted to the University of Cambridge: 64-93

• Voorhoeve, Alex. (2014). How Should We Aggregate Competing Claims?, Ethics, 125(1): 64-87

• Lazar, Seth. (2018). Limited Aggregation and Risk, Philosophy & Public Affairs, 46 (2):117-159

• Horton, Joe. (2017). Aggregation, Complaints, and Risk, Philosophy & Public Affairs, 45(1): 54-81

 

Week 6. Constraints (handout: doc/pdf)

Core readings:

• Hare, Caspar. (2016). Should We Wish Well To All?, Philosophical Review, 125(4): 451-472

• Kowalczyk, Kacper. (2022). People in Suitcases, Journal of Moral Philosophy,  20(1-2): 3-30

Additional readings:

• Tenenbaum, Sergio. (2017). Action, Deontology, and Risk: Against the Multiplicative Model, Ethics, 127(3): 674-707

• Harris, John. (1975). The Survival Lottery, Philosophy, 50(191): 81-87

 

Week 7. Risk Offsetting (handout: doc/pdf)

Core readings:

• Barry, Christian and Garrett Cullity. (2022). Offsetting and Risk Imposition, Ethics, 132(2): 352-381

• Berkey, Brian. (2024). When Is It Permissible to Impose and Offset Risks? A Response to Barry and Cullity, Ethics, 134(4): 512-524

• Byrne, Thomas. (2022). Increasing the Risk That Someone Will Die Without Increasing the Risk That You Will Kill Them, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 107: 395-412

Additional readings:

• Stafánsson, Orri H and Mac Willners. (2023). Why Offsetting is Not Like Shaking a Bag: a Reply to Barry and Cullity, Ethics, Policy and Environment, 26(1): 144-148

• John, Tyler M., Amanda Askell,  and Hayden Wilkinson. (forthcoming). The Moral Inefficacy of Carbon Offsetting, Australasian Journal of Philosophy

 

Week 8. Risk as a Harm (handout: doc/pdf)

Core readings:

• Rowe, Thomas. (2021), Can a risk of harm itself be a harm?,  Analysis,  81(4), 694-701

• Stefánsson, Orri H. (2024). How a pure risk of harm can itself be a harm: a reply to Rowe, Analysis, 81(1): 112-116

Additional readings:

• Smith, Martin. (2024). Probability, Normalcy, and the Right Against Risk Imposition, Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy,  27(3): 505-524

• Maheshwari, Kritika. (2021). On The Harm of Imposing Risk of Harm,  Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 26(4): 965-980